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Why has the political regime in Belarus undergone authoritarian consolidation at the same 
time as Moldova and Ukraine have experienced higher levels of political competition? In this 
excellent book, Lucan Way proposes a theory-based account of divergent post-Soviet political 
trajectories, arguing that variation in regime closure can be explained by levels of state 
coercive and economic control, party organisation, and national identity. Way’s central 
argument is that competitive politics can result from autocratic weakness rather than 
democratic strength. In other words, moments of political competition can best be 
understood as resulting from frustrated ‘authoritarianisation’ rather than successful 
democratisation. Although the basic claim will not be new to many – Way published a widely-
read article in 2002 introducing the phrase ‘pluralism by default’ with a focus on Moldova, 
followed by a less well-known paper from 2003, comparing the cases of Belarus, Moldova, 
and Ukraine – the current book sharpens the theory and updates the story, most importantly 
incorporating information on the events leading up to, and following, the downfall of Viktor 
Yanukovych in Ukraine.  
 
Chapter 1 provides a very accessible account of Way’s argument. Way proposes a number of 
causal mechanisms – including elite defection, nationalist opposition mobilisation, and 
foreign support for the opposition – that translate state disorganization and divided titular 
national identities into political competition in the form of media pluralism, political 
opposition, parliamentary assertiveness, and an impaired ability of the regime to manipulate 
election results. The outcome is ‘pluralism by default’, which ‘describes a range of democratic, 
competitive authoritarian, and soft authoritarian regimes in which political competition 
survives, not because leaders are especially democratic or because institutions or societal 
actors are particularly strong, but because the government is too fragmented and the state 
too weak to monopolize political control’ (p. 2). This leads on to another important and 
distinctive claim of the book: that ‘the same factors that facilitate democratic political 
competition may also thwart the development of stable, well-functioning democratic 
institutions’ (p. 3).  
 
Following a brief historical account in chapter 2 of how perestroika and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union set the stage for subsequent regime paths, chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide engaging 
and richly detailed accounts of differing regime trajectories in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, 
respectively. The case-selection strategy is straightforward: ‘these countries were chosen 
because they provide analytical leverage to understand the sources of post-Cold War regime 
competition: they are similar across a range of factors considered important for regime 
outcomes but exhibit key variations in identity and party and state capacity’ (p. 24). And yet, 
Way steps back somewhat with footnote 108 immediately following this research design 
rationale: ‘This comparison [of country-cases] has a purely heuristic value. It does not allow 
me to control for variables that are similar among my cases. Instead, causal factors are 
assessed through process tracing in the case study chapters.’ Although the focus on process 
tracing is welcome, the apparent relegation of the comparative design in terms of causal 
leverage seems unnecessarily cautious. No doubt in response to concerns of external validity, 
chapter 6 applies the theoretical account to the remaining non-Baltic states of the former 
Soviet Union, and chapter 7 ends with a brief discussion of states outside Eurasia. In these 
broader discussions, Way is refreshingly candid about the limitations of his approach, noting 
cases which do not fit into his narrative. In most instances, Way points to foreign-power 
support or pressure to explain these anomalies – a factor external to the theory proposed in 
the book, but consistent with Way’s work with Steven Levitsky on ‘leverage’. (See p. 155 for 
a discussion of Georgia and the fall of Mikheil Saakashvili, and p. 161 for a discussion of 
Tajikistan and the rise of Emomali Rahmon.)  
 
This is not a book about democratisation, although the concerns of both the target audience 
and the related literatures mean that Way peppers the book with references to democracy, 
sometimes to the detriment of conceptual precision. For example, while Way writes at one 
point that the ‘book examines the origins of competitive and sometimes democratic politics’ 
(p. 5), at other times his goal appears to be to explain varying levels of regime ‘closure’ – a 
concept that, according to Way, ‘heavily overlaps with but is not the same as regime type’ 
(footnote 44, chapter 1). In the same vein, Way refers to politics following the Orange 
Revolution as ‘highly democratic’ (p. 90), but by what metric? Why not simply ‘highly 
pluralistic’, since he goes on to note that this was ‘dysfunctional rule’? Moreover, ‘pluralism’ 
is described very briefly in footnote 5 of chapter 1 as ‘political competition broadly 
understood’. For a concept that is so central to the book’s argument, this is a swift treatment.  
 
The small number of errors and editorial oversights do not detract from the book’s overall 
impact. It is unfortunate, however, that a case of ‘the Ukraine’ (p. 50) slipped through the net, 
given the negative political connotations of that formulation. In addition, whereas Way begins 
the book by stating that sources were consulted in four languages (p. 29), this number 
mysteriously changes to five by the end of the book (p. 143). Finally, although a certain 
amount of repetition is inevitable, and even desirable, in such a book, at times the word-for-
word replication of text gives the impression that the country-specific chapters were 
assembled from pre-existing, self-contained texts (see, for example, the references to Belarus 
and the World Values Survey on pages 128 and 168). These are, however, very minor 
quibbles.  
 
That Way’s argument still has the power to act as a corrective – even after the wave of 
literature following what Thomas Carothers called the ‘end of the transition paradigm’ – 
speaks both to the quality of the book, as well as to the apparent perennial urge (which the 
book critiques) to interpret moments of political competition as intimations of 
democratisation. Along with other recent works from scholars such as Henry Hale, Way’s 
book serves as a sober reminder that pluralism is not synonymous with democracy and that 
the challenge of the latter lies in regulating political competition without stifling it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
